## Origin of probabilities and their application to the multiverse

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UC Davis


Nov 1, 2019
AA \& D. Phillips (PRD Dec 2014) (more info here:
http://albrecht.ucdavis.edu/special-topics/origin-probabil)

## Ways to experience this talk:



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> Have you thought about the "multiverse", "eternal inflation" cosmological "measure problems" etc?

You are
prepared to
fully appreciate the context

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No worries, I will introduce many of these concepts at an introductory level

## Still confused?

Ignore cosmology motivations and consider my (provocative) claims purely in the context of everyday/laboratory physics

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prepared to fully appreciate the context

No worries, I will introduce
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Based on undergrad physics only

Ignore cosmology motivations and consider my (provocative) claims purely in the context of everyday/laboratory physics

## My history with this topic



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## Page: Quantum probabilities cannot address key multiverse questions. (OK, just use classical

 ones)
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## My history with this topic

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { Page: Quantum } \\
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\text { cannot address } \\
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\end{gathered}
$$

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AA: This is fundamentally about giving permission to dismiss certain probability questions (the non quantum ones) as "ill posed".

## My history with this topic



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## My history with this topic



## Outline

1) Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
2) Everyday probabilities
3) Be careful about counting!
4) Implications for multiverse/eternal inflation

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Multipole moment, $\ell$


## Slow rolling of inflaton



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Steinhardt 1982, Linde 1982, Vilenkin 1983, and (then) many others

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## The multiverse of eternal

inflation with multiple
classical rolling directions


Where are we? (Young universe, old universe, curvature, physical properties A, B, C, D, etc)

"Where are we?" $\rightarrow$
Expect the theory to give you a probability distribution in this
space... hopefully with
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predictions

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## Slow rolling of inflaton



Steinhardt 1982, Linde 1982, Vilenkin 1983, and (then) many others

## Quantum vs Non-Quantum probabilities

Non-Quantum probabilities in a toy model:

$$
\begin{array}{lc}
U=A \otimes B \quad & \left.A:\{1\rangle^{A},|2\rangle^{A}\right\} \\
U:\{|11\rangle,|12\rangle,|21\rangle,|22\rangle\} & \left.\left.|i j\rangle \equiv|1\rangle^{A}| | j\right\rangle^{B},|2\rangle^{B}\right\}
\end{array}
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Page, 2009; These slides follow AA \& Phillips 2014

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\end{array}
$$

Possible Measurements $\leftrightarrows$ Projection operators:
Measure A only:

$$
\hat{P}_{i}^{A}=\left(|i\rangle^{A A}\langle i|\right) \otimes \mathbf{1}^{B}=[|i 1\rangle\langle i 1|+|i 2\rangle\langle i 2|]
$$

Measure $B$ only:

$$
\hat{P}_{i}^{B}=\left(|i\rangle^{B B}\langle i|\right) \otimes \mathbf{1}^{A}=[|1 i\rangle\langle 1 i|+|2 i\rangle\langle 2 i|]
$$

Measure entire $U$ :

$$
\hat{P}_{i j} \equiv|i j\rangle\langle i j|
$$

## Quantun BUT: It is impossible to construct a projection operator for the case where you do not know whether it is Non-Quan A or B that is being measured.

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U=A
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$$
\hat{P}_{i}=p_{A} \hat{P}_{i}^{A}+p_{B} \hat{P}_{i}^{B}
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$$
\hat{P}_{i} \hat{P}_{j} \neq \delta_{i j} \hat{P}_{j}
$$

${ }^{4}|j\rangle^{B}$

## Does not

represent a quantum measurement
nents $\Leftarrow$ Projection operators:

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$$
\hat{P}_{i}=p_{A}^{\widehat{P_{i}^{A}}+\widehat{p_{B} P_{i}^{B}}}
$$

multiverse requires
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$$

- All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities

AA \& D. Phillips 2014

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Our *only* experiences with successful practical applications of probabilities are with quantum probabilities

AA \& D. Phillips 2014

- All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities
- One should not use ideas from everyday probabilities to justify probabilities that have been proven to have no quantum origin
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A problem for
many multiverse theories (as practiced)

AA \& D. Phillips 2014

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## Quantum effects in a billiard gas



$$
\left(\begin{array}{cccccccccc}
0^{\circ} & 8 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 8 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 8_{0} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\hline
\end{array}\right.
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$$
\psi \propto \exp \left(\frac{-x^{2}}{2 a^{2}}\right)
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$$
\begin{aligned}
& \Delta b=\delta x_{\perp}+\frac{\delta p_{\perp}}{m} \Delta t=\sqrt{2}\left(a+\frac{\hbar}{2 a} \frac{l}{m \bar{v}}\right) \\
& \min 2^{3 / 2}\left(\frac{\hbar l}{2 m \bar{v}}\right) \equiv \sqrt{l \lambda_{d B} / 2}
\end{aligned}
$$



Quantum effects in a billiard gas



## Quantum effects in a billiard gas



Subsequent collisions amplify the initial uncertainty (treat later collisions classically $\rightarrow$ additional conservatism)


## Quantum effects in a billiard gas

After $n$ collisions:

$$
\Delta b_{n}=\Delta b(1+2 l / r)^{n}
$$



## Quantum effects in a billiard gas


$n_{Q}$ is the number of collisions so that $\Delta b_{n_{Q}}=r$
(full quantum uncertainty as to which is the next collision)


## $n_{Q}$ for a number of physical systems

(all units MKS)

|  | $r$ | $l$ | $m$ | $\bar{v}$ | $\lambda_{d B}$ | $\Delta b$ | $n_{Q}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Air |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Water |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Billiards |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bumper <br> Car |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

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| Air |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Water |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Billiards |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bumper <br> Car | 1 | 2 | 150 | 0.5 | $1.4 \times 10^{-36}$ | $3.4 \times 10^{-18}$ | 25 |



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| Air |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Water |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Billiards | 0.029 | 1 | 0.16 | 1 | $6.6 \times 10^{-34}$ | $5.1 \times 10^{-17}$ | 8 |
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| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- | :--- | :---: |
| Air |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Water | $3.0 \times 10^{-10}$ | $5.4 \times 10^{-10}$ | $3 \times 10^{-26}$ | 460 | $7.6 \times 10^{-12}$ | $1.3 \times 10^{-10}$ | 0.6 |
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| Air | $1.6 \times 10^{-10}$ | $3.4 \times 10^{-7}$ | $4.7 \times 10^{-26}$ | 360 | $6.2 \times 10^{-12}$ | $2.9 \times 10^{-9}$ | -0.3 |
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$\left(n_{Q}<1 \rightarrow\right.$
breakdown of formula, but conclusion robust)

## $n_{Q}$ for a number of physical systems

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# An important role for Brownian motion: Uncertainty in neuron transmission times 



Image from http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v13/n4/full/nrn3209.html

## Analysis of coin flip

$$
\delta t_{f}=\delta t_{n} \times\left(\frac{v_{h}}{v_{h}+v_{f}}\right)
$$

$$
\delta t_{t}=\sqrt{2} \delta t_{f}
$$

$$
f=\frac{4 v_{f}}{\pi d}
$$

$$
\delta N=f \delta t_{t}=0.5
$$

Using:


Coin diameter $=d$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \delta t_{n} \approx 1 \mathrm{~ms} \quad v_{h}=v_{f}=5 \mathrm{~m} / \mathrm{s} \\
& d=0.01 \mathrm{~m}
\end{aligned}
$$

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## 50-50 coin flip probabilities are

 a derivable quantum result$$
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\end{aligned}
$$

Using:


## Analysis of coin flip

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## 50-50 coin flip probabilities are

Usin Without reference to "principle of indifference" etc.
a derivable quantum result

## Analysis of coin flip

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## 50-50 coin flip probabilities are a derivable

Usir Without reference to "principle of indifference" etc. etc.

## Analysis of coin flip

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \delta t_{f}=\delta t \\
&= \sqrt{2} \delta t_{f} \\
& f=\frac{4 v_{f}}{\pi d}
\end{aligned}
$$

NB: Coin flip is "at the margin" of deterministic vs random: Increasing $d$ or deceasing $v_{h}$ can reduce $\delta \mathrm{N}$ substantially
$\delta N=f \delta t_{t}=0.5$

Coin diameter $=d$
Using:

$$
v_{h}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
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$$
v_{h}
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Still, this is a good illustration of how quantum uncertainties can filter up into the macroscopic world, for systems that *are* random.

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Coin diameter $=d$
Still, this is a good illustration of how quantum uncertainties can filter up into the macroscopic world, for systems that *are* random.

## Physical randomness vs "probabilities of belief"

## Physical randomness: To do with physical properties of detector etc

Bayes:

$$
P(\text { Theory } \mid \text { Data })=\frac{P(\text { Data } \mid \text { Theory })}{P(\text { Data })} P(\text { Theory })
$$

## Physical randomness vs "probabilities of belief"

Bayes:

$$
\begin{aligned}
P(\text { Theory } \mid \text { Data }) & =\frac{P(\text { Data } \mid \text { Theory })}{P(\text { Data })} P(\text { Theory }) \\
& \begin{array}{l}
\text { Probabilities of belief: } \\
\text { - Which data yo trust most } \\
\text { - Which theory you like best }
\end{array}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Physical randomness vs "probabilities of belief"

This talk is about physical randomness only
Bayes:

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Adding new data (theory priors can include earlier data sets):

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\underbrace{P_{4}\left(T \mid D_{4}\right)=\frac{P\left(D_{4} \mid T\right)}{P\left(D_{4}\right)} P_{3}(T)}_{P_{5}\left(T \mid D_{5}\right)=\frac{P\left(D_{5} \mid T\right)}{P\left(D_{5}\right)} P_{4}(T)}
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This talk is only about $P(D \mid T)$ wherever it $\frac{5}{\left.D_{5}\right)}$
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Some further thoughts:

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- Special relationship to cosmic structure from inflation: "(cosmic) probability censorship"
- A counterexample: Betting on the digits of Pi (Not!)
- Compare with classical computer
- Compare with color:



## Outline

1) Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
2) Everyday probabilities
3) Be careful about counting!
4) Implications for multiverse/eternal inflation

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## Implications for eternal inflation

\$ No "volume factors"
2) Boltzmann Brain problem reduced
3) No "youngness/end of time" problem

Pocket $A$ with $P_{A}$


Pocket $B$ with $\quad p_{B}$

## Implications for eternal inflation

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Pocket $A$ with $p_{A}$
(from quantum branching ratio)

One semiclassical universe having many more possible observers in it than another (often counted by volume), does *not* give that universe greater statistical weight. Quantum branching ratio into one vs the other $\left(p_{A} / p_{B}\right)$ does count

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## Conclusions

1) All practically applicable probabilities are of physics (quantum) origin.
2) Counting of objects may or MAY NOT be a way of accessing legitimate quantum probabilities
3) Standard discussions of probabilities in cosmology often make errors re 2)
4) The "principle of indifference" has only ever been a phenomenology of point 1), nothing deeper. (Thus it should not form the basis of a "derivation of the Born rule".)
5) 6) and care about 2) allow us to introduce better discipline into cosmological discussions (just say "no"). Implications so far:
a) No (counting based) volume factors
b) Reduced Boltzmann Brain problem
c) No youngness/end of time problem
d) Measure problems apparently resolved?
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Multipole moment, $\ell$


## Additional Slides

## Cosmic structure

## A note on "probability censorship"



## Cosmic structure

## A note on "probability censorship"

Cosmic structure originates in quantum ground state in inflationary cosmology


Cosmic structure originates "superhorizon" in Standard Big Bag (why would they be quantum?)


Scale factor (measures expansion, time)

## All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities

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- Can still invent classical probabilities just to do multiverse cosmology
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## Further discussion

## Bet on the millionth digit of $\pi$ <br> 3.1415926535

208998628034825342117067982148086513282306647093844609550582231725359408128481 117450284102701938521105559644622948954930381964428810975665933446128475648233 786783165271201909145648566923460348610454326648213393607260249141273724587006 606315588174881520920962829254091715364367892590360011330530548820466521384146 951941511609433057270365759591953092186117381932611793105118548074462379962749 567351885752724891227938183011949129833673362440656643086021394946395224737190 702179860943702770539217176293176752384674818467669405132000568127145263560827 785771342757789609173637178721468440901224953430146549585371050792279689258923 542019956112129021960864034418159813629774771309960518707211349999998372978049 951059731732816096318595024459455346908302642522308253344685035261931188171010 003137838752886587533208381420617177669147303598253490428755468731159562863882 353787593751957781857780532171226806613001927876611195909216420198938095257201 065485863278865936153381827968230301952035301852968995773622599413891249721775 283479131515574857242454150695950829533116861727855889075098381754637464939319 255060400927701671139009848824012858361603563707660104710181942955596198946767 837449448255379774726847104047534646208046684259069491293313677028989152104752 162056966024058038150193511253382430035587640247496473263914199272604269922796 782354781636009341721641219924586315030286182974555706749838505494588586926995 690927210797509302955321165344987202755960236480665499119881834797753566369807 426542527862551818417574672890977772793800081647060016145249192173217214772350 141441973568548161361157352552133475741849468438523323907394143334547762416862 518983569485562099219222184272550254256887671790494601653466804988627232791786 085784383827967976681454100953883786360950680064225125205117392984896084128488 626945604241965285022210661186306744278622039194945047123713786960956364371917 287467764657573962413890865832645995813390478027590099465764078951269468398352 595709825822620522489407726719478268482601476990902640136394437455305068203496

## Further discussion

## Bet on the millionth digit of $\pi$ <br> 3.1415926535 20899862803 - The *only* thing random is the choice of digit to bet on 11745028410 <br> $\qquad$

786783165271201909145648566923460348610454326648213393607260249141273724587006 606315588174881520920962829254091715364367892590360011330530548820466521384146 951941511609433057270365759591953092186117381932611793105118548074462379962749 567351885752724891227938183011949129833673362440656643086021394946395224737190 702179860943702770539217176293176752384674818467669405132000568127145263560827 785771342757789609173637178721468440901224953430146549585371050792279689258923 542019956112129021960864034418159813629774771309960518707211349999998372978049 951059731732816096318595024459455346908302642522308253344685035261931188171010 003137838752886587533208381420617177669147303598253490428755468731159562863882 353787593751957781857780532171226806613001927876611195909216420198938095257201 065485863278865936153381827968230301952035301852968995773622599413891249721775 283479131515574857242454150695950829533116861727855889075098381754637464939319 255060400927701671139009848824012858361603563707660104710181942955596198946767 837449448255379774726847104047534646208046684259069491293313677028989152104752 162056966024058038150193511253382430035587640247496473263914199272604269922796 782354781636009341721641219924586315030286182974555706749838505494588586926995 690927210797509302955321165344987202755960236480665499119881834797753566369807 426542527862551818417574672890977772793800081647060016145249192173217214772350 141441973568548161361157352552133475741849468438523323907394143334547762416862 518983569485562099219222184272550254256887671790494601653466804988627232791786 085784383827967976681454100953883786360950680064225125205117392984896084128488 626945604241965285022210661186306744278622039194945047123713786960956364371917 287467764657573962413890865832645995813390478027590099465764078951269468398352 595709825822620522489407726719478268482601476990902640136394437455305068203496

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 $702179860943 / 02 / / 053921 / 1 / 62931 / 6 / 523846 / 481846 / 66940513200056812 / 14526356082 /$ 785771342757789609173637178721468440901224953430146549585371050792279689258923 542019956112129021960864034418159813629774771309960518707211349999998372978049 951059731732816096318595024459455346908302642522308253344685035261931188171010 003137838752886587533208381420617177669147303598253490428755468731159562863882 353787593751957781857780532171226806613001927876611195909216420198938095257201 065485863278865936153381827968230301952035301852968995773622599413891249721775 283479131515574857242454150695950829533116861727855889075098381754637464939319 255060400927701671139009848824012858361603563707660104710181942955596198946767 837449448255379774726847104047534646208046684259069491293313677028989152104752 162056966024058038150193511253382430035587640247496473263914199272604269922796 782354781636009341721641219924586315030286182974555706749838505494588586926995 690927210797509302955321165344987202755960236480665499119881834797753566369807 426542527862551818417574672890977772793800081647060016145249192173217214772350 141441973568548161361157352552133475741849468438523323907394143334547762416862 518983569485562099219222184272550254256887671790494601653466804988627232791786 085784383827967976681454100953883786360950680064225125205117392984896084128488 626945604241965285022210661186306744278622039194945047123713786960956364371917 287467764657573962413890865832645995813390478027590099465764078951269468398352 595709825822620522489407726719478268482601476990902640136394437455305068203496
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## Bet on the millionth digit of $\pi$ <br> 3.1415926535 20899862803 11745028410 78678316527 60631558817 95194151160 56735188575 70217986094 78577134275 54201995611 95105973173 00313783875 35378759375 06548586327 28347913151 25506040092 83744944825 16205696602 <br> - The *only* thing random is the choice of digit to bet on - Fairness is about lack of correlation between digit choice and digit value <br> - Choice of digit comes from <br> $>$ Brain (neurons with quantum uncertainties) <br> $>$ Random number generator $\rightarrow$ seed $\rightarrow$ time stamp (when you press ENTER) $\rightarrow$ brain

$782354781636009341 / 216412199245863150302861829 / 4555 / 06 / 49838505494588586926995$ 690927210797509302955321165344987202755960236480665499119881834797753566369807 426542527862551818417574672890977772793800081647060016145249192173217214772350 141441973568548161361157352552133475741849468438523323907394143334547762416862 518983569485562099219222184272550254256887671790494601653466804988627232791786 085784383827967976681454100953883786360950680064225125205117392984896084128488 626945604241965285022210661186306744278622039194945047123713786960956364371917 287467764657573962413890865832645995813390478027590099465764078951269468398352 595709825822620522489407726719478268482601476990902640136394437455305068203496

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54201995611
95105973173
00313783875
35378759375
06548586327
28347913151
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83744944825
16205696602 78235478163 69092721079

## Bet on the millionth digit of $\pi$

- The *only* thing random is the choice of digit to bet on
- Fairness is about lack of correlation between digit choice and digit value
- Choice of digit comes from
- Brain (neurons with quantum uncertainties)
$>$ Random number generator $\rightarrow$ seed $\rightarrow$ time stamp (when you press ENTER) $\rightarrow$ brain


51888356998555620992192222 Payout: 46001653466804988627232791786
085784383827969976681454 Payout:
626945604241965285022210
287467764657573962413890865832645995813
595709825822620522489407726719478268482

$$
P_{\pi}=\lim _{N_{t o t} \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N_{\text {tot }}} \sum_{\{i\}}\left(N_{\pi}^{i}-4.5\right)=0
$$

## Further discussion

Classical Computer: The "computational degrees of freedom" of a classical computer are very classical: Engineered to be well isolated from the quantum fluctuations that are everywhere $\rightarrow$

- Computations are deterministic
- "Random" is artificial
- Model a classical billiard gas on a computer:
> All "random" fluctuations are determined by (or "readings of") the initial

10001000111101010

10001000101001010

11011000101001010

10001010111101010

10001000101101010 state.

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## Our ideas about probability are like our ideas about color:

- Quantum physics gives the correct foundation to our understanding
- Our "classical" intuition predates our knowledge of QM by a long long time, and works just fine for most things
- Fundamental quantum understanding needed to fix classical misunderstandings in certain cases.




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    3.1415926535 20899862803 11745028410 78678316527 60631558817 95194151160 56735188575 70217986094 78577134275 54201995611 95105973173 00313783875 35378759375 06548586327 28347913151 25506040092 83744944825 16205696602 78235478163 69092721079

    - The *only* thing random is the choice of digit to bet on
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    - Choice of digit comes from
    $>$ Brain (neurons with quantum uncertainties)
    $>$ Random number generator $\rightarrow$ seed $\rightarrow$ time stamp (when you press ENTER) $\rightarrow$ brain
    > Etc
    - The only randomness in a bet on a digit of $\pi$ is quantum!
     141441973568548161361157352552133475741849468438523323907394143334547762416862 518983569485562099219222184272550254256887671790494601653466804988627232791786 085784383827967976681454100953883786360950680064225125205117392984896084128488 626945604241965285022210661186306744278622039194945047123713786960956364371917 287467764657573962413890865832645995813390478027590099465764078951269468398352 595709825822620522489407726719478268482601476990902640136394437455305068203496

