# Origin of probabilities and their application to the multiverse

Andreas Albrecht UC Davis

2015: THE SPACETIME ODYSSEY CONTINUES Stockholm June 4, 2015

AA & D. Phillips (PRD Dec 2014) http://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953

# Origin of probabilities and their application to the multiverse

Andreas Albrecht UC Davis

2015: THE SPACETIME ODYSSEY CONTINUES Stockholm June 4, 2015

AA & D. Phillips (PRD Dec 2014)

# Thank you Katie!!!



# Origin of probabilities and their application to the multiverse

Andreas Albrecht UC Davis

2015: THE SPACETIME ODYSSEY CONTINUES Stockholm June 4, 2015

AA & D. Phillips (PRD Dec 2014)

Consumers

&

#### Producers





Consumers

&

#### Producers





Consumers

#### &









Consumers

#### &









8

Consumers

#### &















Page: Quantum probabilities cannot address key multiverse questions. (OK, just use classical ones)

Page: Quantum probabilities cannot address key multiverse questions. (OK, just use classical ones)

AA: All randomness/ probabilities are quantum (coin flip, card choice etc)



Page: Quantum probabilities cannot address key multiverse questions. (OK, just use classical ones) AA: All randomness/ probabilities are quantum (coin flip, card choice etc)

> AA: A deeper problem than the measure problems for the multiverse

Page: Quantum probabilities cannot address key multiverse questions. (OK, just use classical ones) AA: All randomness/ probabilities are quantum (coin flip, card choice etc)

> AA: A deeper problem than the measure problems for A potential Utiverse issue even for finite

models



Page: Quantum probabilities cannot address key multiverse questions. (OK, just use classical ones) AA: All randomness/ probabilities are quantum (coin flip, card choice etc)

> AA: A deep problem than the measure problems for the multiverse

AA: This is fundamentally about giving permission to dismiss certain probability questions (the non quantum ones) as "ill posed". AA: Write paper ining this Phillips

Page: Quantum probabilities cannot address key multiverse questions. (OK, just use classical ones) AA: All randomness/ probabilities are quantum (coin flip, card choice etc)

> AA: A deep problem than the measure problems for the multiverse

AA: This is fundamentall about giving permise dismiss certain pr questions (th quantum ones posed".

Perhaps this type of discipline can help resolve the measure problems of the multiverse/eternal inflation

Page: Quantum probabilities cannot address key multiverse questions. (OK, just use classical ones) AA: All randomness/ probabilities are quantum (coin flip, card choice etc)

AA: This is fundamentallabout giving permise dismiss certain pr questions (th quantum ones posed". Perhaps this type of discipline can help resolve the measure problems of the multiverse/eternal inflation AA: A doep problem than the measure problems for the multiverse

Page: Quantum probabilities cannot address key multiverse questions. (OK, just use classical ones)

AA: All randomness/ probabilities are quantum (coin flip, card choice etc)

about giving permiss dismiss certain pr questions (th quantum ones posed".

AA: This is fundamentall Apparently this type of discipline can help resolve the measure problems of the multiverse/eternal inflation

an the prob sure prob' m. for the multiverse

	Outline
1)	Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
2)	Everyday probabilities
3)	Be careful about counting!
4)	Implications for multiverse/eternal inflation

	Outline
1)	Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
2)	Everyday probabilities
3)	Be careful about counting!
4)	Implications for multiverse/eternal inflation















Steinhardt 1982, Linde 1982, Vilenkin 1983, and (then) many others



Steinhardt 1982, Linde 1982, Vilenkin 1983, and (then) many others



Steinhardt 1982, Linde 1982, Vilenkin 1983, and (then) many others

The multiverse of eternal inflation with multiple classical rolling directions

Self-reproduction regime



Where are we? (Young universe, old universe, curvature, physical properties A, B, C, D, etc)

Classically Rolling C



The multiverse of eternal inflation with multiple classical rolling directions

Self-reproduction regime



Where are we? (Young universe, old universe, curvature, physical properties A, B, C, D, etc)

Classically

Rolling

Classically Rolling D "Where are we?" → Expect the theory to give you a probability distribution in this space... hopefully with some sharp predictions The multiverse of eternal inflation with multiple classical rolling directions

Self-reproduction regime



Where are we? (Young universe, old universe, curvature, physical properties A, B, C, D, etc)

Classically

Rolling

"Anything that can happen will happen infinitely many times" (A. Guth) "Where are we?"→ Expect the theory to give you a probability distribution in this space... hopefully with some sharp predictions



Where are we? (Young universe, old universe, curvature, physical properties A, B, C, D, etc)

Classically "Anything that can happen will happen infinitely many times" (A. Guth) "Where are we?" → Expect the theory to give you a probability distribution in this space... hopefully with some sharp predictions\_

#### The multiverse of eternal inflation with multiple classical rolling direct S<sup>-</sup>



String theory landscape even more complicated (e.g. many types of eternal inflation) *Rolling* 

В

Where are we? (Young universe, old universe, curvature, physical properties A, B, C, D, etc)

Classically

"Anything that can happen will happen infinitely many times" (A. Guth) "Where are we?"→ Expect the theory to give you a probability distribution in this space... hopefully with some sharp predictions
Quantum vs Non-Quantum probabilities

Non-Quantum probabilities in a toy model:

$$U = A \otimes B \qquad A: \{|1\rangle^{A}, |2\rangle^{A}\} \qquad B: \{|1\rangle^{B}, |2\rangle^{B}\}$$
$$U: \{|11\rangle, |12\rangle, |21\rangle, |22\rangle\} \qquad |ij\rangle \equiv |i\rangle^{A} |j\rangle^{B}$$

Page, 2009; These slides follow AA & Phillips 2014

Quantum vs Non-Quantum probabilities

Non-Quantum probabilities in a toy model:

$$U = A \otimes B \qquad A: \{|1\rangle^{A}, |2\rangle^{A}\} \qquad B: \{|1\rangle^{B}, |2\rangle^{B}\}$$
$$U: \{|11\rangle, |12\rangle, |21\rangle, |22\rangle\} \qquad |ij\rangle \equiv |i\rangle^{A} |j\rangle^{B}$$

Possible Measurements ← → Projection operators:

Measure A only:

Measure *B* only:

$$\hat{P}_{i}^{A} = \left(\left|i\right\rangle^{A} \left|i\right\rangle \otimes \mathbf{1}^{B} = \left[\left|i1\right\rangle\left\langlei1\right| + \left|i2\right\rangle\left\langlei2\right|\right]$$
$$\hat{P}_{i}^{B} = \left(\left|i\right\rangle^{B} \left|i\right\rangle \otimes \mathbf{1}^{A} = \left[\left|1i\right\rangle\left\langle1i\right| + \left|2i\right\rangle\left\langle2i\right|\right]$$
$$\hat{P}_{ij} = \left|ij\right\rangle\left\langleij\right|$$



Possible Measurements  $\leftarrow \rightarrow$  Projection operators:

Measure A only:

Measure *B* only:

$$\hat{P}_{i}^{A} = \left(\left|i\right\rangle^{A} \left\langle i\right|\right) \otimes \mathbf{1}^{B} = \left[\left|i1\right\rangle\left\langle i1\right| + \left|i2\right\rangle\left\langle i2\right|\right]$$
$$\hat{P}_{i}^{B} = \left(\left|i\right\rangle^{B} \left\langle i\right|\right) \otimes \mathbf{1}^{A} = \left[\left|1i\right\rangle\left\langle 1i\right| + \left|2i\right\rangle\left\langle 2i\right|\right]$$
$$\hat{P}_{ij} = \left|ij\right\rangle\left\langle ij\right|$$

QuantumBUT: It is impossible to construct a  
projection operator for the case  
where you do not know whether it is  
A or B that is being measured.Non-QuanCould Write  
$$\hat{P}_i = p_A \hat{P}_i^A + p_B \hat{P}_i^B$$

Possible Measurements ← → Projection operators:

Measure A only:

Measure *B* only:

$$\hat{P}_{i}^{A} = \left(\left|i\right\rangle^{A} \left|i\right\rangle \otimes \mathbf{1}^{B} = \left[\left|i1\right\rangle\left\langlei1\right| + \left|i2\right\rangle\left\langlei2\right|\right]$$
$$\hat{P}_{i}^{B} = \left(\left|i\right\rangle^{B} \left|i\right\rangle \otimes \mathbf{1}^{A} = \left[\left|1i\right\rangle\left\langle1i\right| + \left|2i\right\rangle\left\langle2i\right|\right]$$
$$\hat{P}_{ij} = \left|ij\right\rangle\left\langleij\right|$$



Possible Measurements  $\leftarrow \rightarrow$  Projection operators:

Measure A only:

Measure *B* only:

$$\hat{P}_{i}^{A} = \left(\left|i\right\rangle^{A} \left|\left|\right\rangle \otimes \mathbf{1}^{B}\right| = \left[\left|i1\right\rangle\left\langlei1\right| + \left|i2\right\rangle\left\langlei2\right|\right]$$
$$\hat{P}_{i}^{B} = \left(\left|i\right\rangle^{B} \left|\left\langlei\right|\right\rangle \otimes \mathbf{1}^{A}\right| = \left[\left|1i\right\rangle\left\langle1i\right| + \left|2i\right\rangle\left\langle2i\right|\right]$$
$$\hat{P}_{ii} = \left|ij\right\rangle\left\langleij\right|$$







# • All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities

# All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities Our \*only\* experiences

Our \*only\* experiences with successful practical applications of probabilities are with quantum probabilities

- All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities
- One should not use ideas from everyday probabilities to justify probabilities that have been proven to have no quantum origin

- All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities
- One should not use ideas from everyday probabilities to justify probabilities that have been proven to have no quantum origin

A problem for many multiverse theories

- All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities
- One should not use ideas from everyday probabilities to justify probabilities that have been proven to have no quantum origin

A problem for many multiverse theories (as practiced)







		Outline
	1)	Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
<	2)	Everyday probabilities
	3)	Be careful about counting!
	4)	Implications for multiverse/eternal inflation









Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15



















 $\Delta b_{n_Q} = r$ 

(full quantum uncertainty as to which is the next collision)



	r	l	m	$\overline{\mathcal{V}}$	$\lambda_{dB}$	$\Delta b$	$n_{Q}$
Air							
Water							
Billiards							
Bumper Car							

	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\lambda_{dB}$	$\Delta b$	$n_{Q}$
Air							
Water							
Billiards							
Bumper Car	1	2	150	0.5	$1.4 \times 10^{-36}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-18}$	25



	r	l	т	$\overline{v}$	$\dot{\mathcal{H}}_{dB}$	$\Delta b$	$n_{Q}$
Air							
Water							
Billiards	0.029	1	0.16	1	$6.6 \times 10^{-34}$	$5.1 \times 10^{-17}$	8
Bumper Car	1	2	150	0.5	$1.4 \times 10^{-36}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-18}$	25





Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15

	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\lambda_{dB}$	$\Delta b$	$n_{Q}$
Air							
Water	$3.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$5.4 \times 10^{-10}$	$3 \times 10^{-26}$	460	$7.6 \times 10^{-12}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-10}$	0.6
Billiards	0.029	1	0.16	1	$6.6 \times 10^{-34}$	$5.1 \times 10^{-17}$	8
Bumper Car	1	2	150	0.5	$1.4 \times 10^{-36}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-18}$	25







Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15

	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\lambda_{dB}$	$\Delta b$	$n_{Q}$
Air	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-7}$	$4.7 \times 10^{-26}$	360	$6.2 \times 10^{-12}$	$2.9 \times 10^{-9}$	-0.3
Water	$3.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$5.4 \times 10^{-10}$	$3 \times 10^{-26}$	460	$7.6 \times 10^{-12}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-10}$	0.6
Billiards	0.029	1	0.16	1	$6.6 \times 10^{-34}$	$5.1 \times 10^{-17}$	8
Bumper Car	1	2	150	0.5	$1.4 \times 10^{-36}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-18}$	25









Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15

	r	l	т	$\overline{\mathcal{V}}$	$\lambda_{dB}$	$\Delta b$	$n_{O}$
Air	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-7}$	$4.7 \times 10^{-26}$	360	$6.2 \times 10^{-12}$	$2.9 \times 10^{-9}$	-0.3
Water	$3.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$5.4 \times 10^{-10}$	$3 \times 10^{-26}$	460	$7.6 \times 10^{-12}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-10}$	0.6
Billiards	0.029	1	0.16	1	$6.6 \times 10^{-34}$	5.1 Qu	antum
Bumper	1	2	150	0.5	$1.4 \times 10^{-36}$	3. at	every
Car						СО	llision









Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15

(all units MKS)

	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\lambda_{dB}$	$\Delta b$	n <sub>o</sub>
Air	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-7}$	$4.7 \times 10^{-26}$	360	$6.2 \times 10^{-12}$	$2.9 \times 10^{-9}$	-0.3
Water	$3.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$5.4 \times 10^{-10}$	$3 \times 10^{-26}$	460	$7.6 \times 10^{-12}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-10}$	0.6
Billiards	0.029	1	0.16	1	$6.6 \times 10^{-34}$	5.1 Qu	antum
Bumper	1	2	150	0.5	$1.4 \times 10^{-36}$	at at	every
Car						СО	llision







(n<sub>Q</sub> < 1→ breakdown of formula, but conclusion robust)



Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15

### $\mathcal{N}_O$ for a number of physical systems



### $\mathcal{N}_O$ for a number of physical systems


# An important role for Brownian motion: Uncertainty in neuron transmission times



Image from http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v13/n4/full/nrn3209.html

$$\delta t_f = \delta t_n \times \left(\frac{v_h}{v_h + v_f}\right)$$
$$\delta t_t = \sqrt{2}\delta t_f$$
$$f = \frac{4v_f}{\pi d}$$

 $\delta N = f \, \delta t_t = 0.5$ 



Coin diameter = d

Using:

$$\delta t_n \approx 1ms$$
  $v_h = v_f = 5m/s$ 

d = 0.01m

$$\delta t_f = \delta t_n \times \left( \frac{v_h}{v_h + v_f} \right)$$
$$\delta t_t = \sqrt{2} \delta t_f$$
$$f = \frac{4v_f}{\pi d}$$

 $\delta N = f \, \delta t_t = 0.5$ 

Using:

$$\delta t_n \approx 1ms$$
  $v_h = v_f$ 

d = 0.01m

50-50 coin flip probabilities are a derivable quantum result

 $\mathcal{V}_{f}$ 

=

$$\delta t_{f} = \delta t_{n} \times \left( \frac{v_{h}}{v_{h} + v_{f}} \right)$$
$$\delta t_{t} = \sqrt{2} \delta t_{f}$$
$$f = \frac{4v_{f}}{\pi d}$$

 $\delta N = f \, \delta t_t = 0.5$ 

Usin Without reference to "principle of indifference" etc. d etc. 50-50 coin flip probabilities are a derivable quantum result

 $\mathcal{V}_{f}$ 

Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15



NB: Coin flip is "at the margin" of deterministic vs random: Increasing d or deceasing  $v_h$  can reduce  $\delta N$  substantially

 $\delta N = f \, \delta t_t = 0.5$ 

$$\mathcal{V}_h$$

 $\mathcal{V}_{f}$ 

Coin diameter = d

Using:

$$\delta t_n \approx 1ms$$
  $v_h = v_f = 5m/s$ 

d = 0.01m



uncertainties can filter up into the macroscopic world, for systems that \*are\* random.



uncertainties can filter up into the macroscopic world, for systems that \*are\* random.



Bayes:

$$P(Theory | Data) = \frac{P(Data | Theory)}{P(Data)} P(Theory)$$

$$P(Data)$$

$$Probabilities of belief:$$

$$Which data you trust most$$

$$Which theory you like best$$

Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15



Bayes:

$$P(Theory \mid Data) = \frac{P(Data \mid Theory)}{P(Data)} P(Theory)$$

Bayes:

$$P(Theory \mid Data) = \frac{P(Data \mid Theory)}{P(Data)} P(Theory)$$

NB: The goal of science is to get sufficiently good data that probabilities of belief are inconsequential

Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15

Adding new data (theory priors can include earlier data sets):

$$P_{4}(T | D_{4}) = \frac{P(D_{4} | T)}{P(D_{4})} P_{3}(T)$$

$$P_{5}(T | D_{5}) = \frac{P(D_{5} | T)}{P(D_{5})} P_{4}(T)$$

Adding new data (theory priors can include earlier data sets):



Adding new data (theory priors can include earlier data sets):

$$P_1(T \mid D_1) = \frac{P(D_1 \mid T)}{P(D_1)} P_0(T)$$

This initial "model uncertainty" prior is the only *P(T)* that is a *pure* probability of belief.

$$P_{4}(T \mid D_{4}) = \frac{P(D_{4} \mid T)}{P(D_{4})} P_{3}(T)$$

$$P_{5}(T \mid D_{5}) = \frac{P(D_{5} \mid T)}{P(D_{5})} P_{4}(T)$$

Adding new data (theory priors can include earlier data sets):

$$P_{1}(T | D_{1}) = \frac{P(D_{1} | T)}{P(D_{1})} P_{0}(T)$$

This initial "model uncertainty" prior is the only *P(T)* that is a *pure* probability of belief.

 $P_{4}(T \mid D_{4}) = \frac{P(D_{4} \mid T)}{P(D_{4})}P_{3}(T)$ 

This talk is only about P(D|T) wherever it  $\frac{P(D_5|T)}{D_5}$ appears

Adding new data (theory priors can include earlier data sets):

$$P_{1}(T \mid D_{1}) = \frac{P(D_{1} \mid T)}{P(D_{1})} P_{0}(T)$$

This initial "model uncertainty" prior is the only *P(T)* that is a *pure* probability of belief.

This talk is only about P(D|T) wherever it appears

Adding new data (theory priors can include earlier data sets):

$$P_{1}(T | D_{1}) = \frac{P(D_{1} | T)}{P(D_{1})} P_{0}(T)$$

$$P_{1}(T | D_{1}) = \frac{P(D_{1} | T)}{P(D_{1})} P_{0}(T)$$
This initial "model  
uncertainty" prior is the  
only  $P(T)$  that is a *pure*  
probability of belief  
This is the only part  
of the formula  
where physical  
randomness  
appears  
appears

Adding new data (theory priors can include earlier data sets):

This initial "model  
uncertainty" prior is the  
only 
$$P(T)$$
 that is a *pure*  
probability of belief  
This is the only part  
of the formula  
where physical  
This talk is only about  $P(D|T)$   
appears  
This initial "model  
uncertainty" prior is the  
only  $P(T)$  that is a *pure*  
probability of belief  
This is the only part  
of the formula  
where physical  
appears

• Proof by exhaustion not realistic

- Proof by exhaustion not realistic
- One counterexample (practical utility of non-quantum probabilities) will undermine our entire argument.

- Proof by exhaustion not realistic
- One counterexample (practical utility of non-quantum probabilities) will undermine our entire argument
- Can still invent classical probabilities just to do multiverse cosmology

- Proof by exhaustion not realistic
- One counterexample (practical utility of non-quantum probabilities) will undermine our entire argument
- Can still invent classical probabilities just to do multiverse cosmology
- Not a problem for many finite theories (AA, Banks & Fischler)

- Proof by exhaustion not realistic
- One counterexample (practical utility of non-quantum probabilities) will undermine our entire argument
- Can still invent classical probabilities just to do multiverse cosmology
- Not a problem for many finite theories (AA, Banks & Fischler)
- Which theories really do require classical probabilities not yet resolved rigorously.

- Proof by exhaustion not realistic
- One counterexample (practical utility of non-quantum probabilities) will undermine our entire argument
- Can still invent classical probabilities just to do multiverse cosmology
- Not a problem for many finite theories (AA, Banks & Fischler)
- Which theories really do require classical probabilities not yet resolved rigorously (symmetry?... simplicity? See below)

- Proof by exhaustion not realistic
- One counterexample (practical utility of non-quantum probabilities) will undermine our entire argument
- Can still invent classical probabilities just to do multiverse cosmology
- Not a problem for many finite theories (AA, Banks & Fischler)
- Which theories really do require classical probabilities not yet resolved rigorously (symmetry?... simplicity? See below)

#### Some further thoughts:

## Some further thoughts:

- Special relationship to cosmic structure from inflation: "probability censorship"
- A counterexample: Betting on the digits of Pi (Not!)
- Compare with classical computer
- Compare with color:





		Outline
	1)	Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
<	2)	Everyday probabilities
	3)	Be careful about counting!
	4)	Implications for multiverse/eternal inflation

		Outline
	1)	Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
	2)	Everyday probabilities
<	3)	Be careful about counting!
	4)	Implications for multiverse/eternal inflation

 "Randomness is (quantum) <u>physics</u>"
 Counting may or <u>MAY NOT</u> have a role in inferring or representing physical randomness

- "Randomness is (quantum) physics"
- Counting may or <u>MAY NOT</u> have a role in inferring or representing physical randomness
- Example: Flip a coin and choose a ball:



- "Randomness is (quantum) physics"
- Counting may or <u>MAY NOT</u> have a role in inferring or representing physical randomness
- Example: Flip a coin and choose a ball:



- "Randomness is (quantum) physics"
- Counting may or <u>MAY NOT</u> have a role in inferring or representing physical randomness
- Example: Flip a coin and choose a ball:



# Now ask: What is the probability that a ball drawn from the "Results" bowl is red?



Now ask: What is the probability that a ball drawn from the "Results" bowl is red?

• Different physical "completions" of this question are possible which give different answers. (≈ measures)



Now ask: What is the probability that a ball drawn from the "Results" bowl is red?

• Different physical "completions" of this question are possible which give different answers. (≈ measures)

Results

Albred

Counting is NOT enough.

Results

Results
- Different physical "completions" of this question are possible which give different answers. (≈ measures)
- Counting is NOT enough.

Results



Albrec

NB: "Sleeping Beauty problem"

Results

• Different physical "completions" of this question are possible which give different answers. (≈ measures)

Counting is NOT enough.

119

Resu

In a multiverse with many copies of you, there simply is \*no\* physical completion for the question "which observer am I?". Future data may address this, but not in time to make predictions.

- Different physical "completions" of this question are possible which give different answers. (≈ measures)
- Counting is NOT enough.

In a multiverse with many copies of you, there simply is \*no\* physical completion for the question "which observer am I?". Future data may address this, but not in time to make predictions.

Different physical "completions" of this question are possible which give different answers. (≈ measures)

Counting is NOT enough.

Résults In a multiverse with many copies of you, there simply is \*no\* physical completion for the question "which observer am I?". Future data may address this, but

Its

not in time to make predictions.

Albri

• Different physical "completions" of this question are possible which give different answers. (≈ measures)

Counting is NOT enough.

Result In a multiverse with many copies of you, there simply is \*no\* obvsical completion for the thich observer am I?". Y address this, but make predictions.

ts

• Different physical "completions" of this question are possible which give different answers. (≈ measures)

Counting is NOT enough.

Results In a multiverse with many copies of you, there simply is \*no\* obysical completion for the

This is where things go wrong in the standard treatment of the multiverse hich observers counting observers has no predictive value

ITS

• Different physical "completions" of this question are possible which give different answers. (≈ measures)

Counting is NOT enough.

acuits Results In a multiverse with many copies No point in of you, there simply is \*nc/counting physical completion for t which obser In ma for these This is where things cases counting o go wrong in the has no predictive standard treatment value of the multiverse

		Outline
	1)	Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
	2)	Everyday probabilities
<	3)	Be careful about counting!
	4)	Implications for multiverse/eternal inflation

	Outline
1	Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
2	Everyday probabilities
3	Be careful about counting!
4	Implications for multiverse/eternal inflation

	Outline
1)	Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
2)	Everyday probabilities
3)	Be careful about counting!
4)	Implications for multiverse/eternal inflation

No "volume factors"

- 2) Boltzmann Brain problem reduced
- 3) No "youngness/end of time" problem



No "volume factors"

- 2) Boltzmann Brain problem reduced
- 3) No "youngness/end of time" problem



One semiclassical universe having many more possible observers in it than another (often counted by volume), does \*not\* give that universe greater statistical weight. Quantum branching ratio into one vs the other ( $p_A / p_B$ ) does count

Pocket *B* with  $p_B$ 

Pocket A with  $P_A$ 

Albrecht @ Stockholm

No "volume factors"

- 2) Boltzmann Brain problem reduced
- 3) No "youngness/end of time" problem









Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15







- 1) No "volume factors"
- 2) Boltzmann Brain problem reduced
- 3) No "youngness/end of time" problem



- 1) No "volume factors"
- 2) Boltzmann Brain problem reduced
- 3) No "youngness/end of time" problem



- 1) No "volume factors"
- 2) Boltzmann Brain problem reduced
- No "oungness/end of time" problem



- No "volume factors" 1)
- Boltzmann Brain problem reduced 2)
- No "oungness/end of time" problem 3)



Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15

& Vanchurin

- 1) No "volume factors"
- 2) Boltzmann Brain problem reduced
  - No youngness/end of time" problem



→ Wavefunction cannot give probabilities for which pocket you are in.  $\rightarrow$  Time cutoff only there as (wrong) attempt to determine which pocket → The youngness/end of time problem is asking a question the theory cannot answer

#### Conclusions

- All practically applicable probabilities are of physics (quantum) origin.
- 2) Counting of objects may or MAY NOT be a way of accessing legitimate quantum probabilities
- Standard discussions of probabilities in cosmology often make errors re 2)
- 4) 1) and care about 2) allow us to introduce better discipline into cosmological discussions (just say "no"). Implications so far:
  - a) No (counting based) volume factors
  - b) Reduced Boltzmann Brain problem
  - c) No youngness/end of time problem
  - d) Measure problems apparently resolved?
- 5) More rigorous treatment of eternal inflation (etc) needed to determine full implications.

4)

ties are of physics T be a way of abilities Ities in cosmology often

1) and (1) and (2) allow us to introduce better discipline into cosmological discussions (just say "no"). Implications so far:

- a) No (counting based) volume factors
- b) Reduced Boltzmann Brain problem
- c) No youngness/end of time problem
- d) Measure problems apparently resolved?
- 5) More rigorous treatment of eternal inflation (etc) needed to determine full implications.

 $\rightarrow$  I still have other concerns about eternal inflation that ties are of physics makes me prefer finite theories,  $\rightarrow$  but this "probability" T be a way of discipline" may resolve what I abilities used to think was the most ities in cosmology often troubling issue uce better 4) Landscape 1) and AL ZI (just say "no"). discipline into cosmol OK too Implications so far: No (counting based) volume factors a) b) **Reduced Boltzmann Brain problem** No youngness/end of time problem **C**) Measure problems apparently resolved? d) More rigorous treatment of eternal inflation (etc) 5)

needed to determine full implications.

In a systematic treatment the classical probabilities will reappear as "priors". Same math but very different role.

1) and discipline into cosmol Implications so far:

4)

Landscape OK too

s (just say "no").

uce

- a) No (counting based) volume factors
- b) Reduced Boltzmann Brain problem
- c) No youngness/end of time problem
- d) Measure problems apparently resolved?
- 5) More rigorous treatment of eternal inflation (etc) needed to determine full implications.

In a systematic treatment the classical probabilities will reappear as "priors". Same math but very different role.

discipline into cosmol Implications so far:

4)

Landscape OK too uce .... s (just say "no").

a) No (counting based) volume factors

- b) Reduced Boltzmann Brain problem
- c) No youngness/end of time p

d) Measure problems appar

5) More rigorous treatment of eter needed to determine full implica.

Perhaps related to work by Nomura and Garriga & Vilenkin and collaborators

In a systematic treatment the classical probabilities will reappear as "priors". Same math but very different role.

discipline into cosmol Implications so far:

4)

Landscape OK too

s (just say "no").

UCE

a) No (counting based) volume factors

b) Reduced Boltzmann Brain problem

c) No youngness/end of time pr

Clashes with my work on the "clock ambiguity" blems appar of eter implica Perhaps related to work by Nomura and Garriga & Vilenkin and collaborators

#### Conclusions

- All practically applicable probabilities are of physics (quantum) origin.
- 2) Counting of objects may or MAY NOT be a way of accessing legitimate quantum probabilities
- Standard discussions of probabilities in cosmology often make errors re 2)
- 4) 1) and care about 2) allow us to introduce better discipline into cosmological discussions (just say "no"). Implications so far:
  - a) No (counting based) volume factors
  - b) Reduced Boltzmann Brain problem
  - c) No youngness/end of time problem
  - d) Measure problems apparently resolved?
- 5) More rigorous treatment of eternal inflation (etc) needed to determine full implications.

#### Conclusions

- All practically applicable probabilities are of physics (quantum) origin.
- 2) Counting of objects may or MAY NOT be a way of accessing legitimate quantum probabilities
- 3) Standard discussions of probabilities in cosmology often make errors re 2)
- 4) 1) and care about 2) allow us to introduce better discipline into cosmological discussions (just say "no"). Implications so far:
  - a) No (counting based) volume factors
  - b) Reduced Boltzmann Brain problem
  - c) No youngness/end of time problem
  - d) Measure problems apparently resolved?
- 5) More rigorous treatment of eternal inflation (etc) needed to determine full implications.



# **Additional Slides**

A note on "probability censorship"

#### **Cosmic structure** Today 10 Observable Structure $\underline{\delta \rho}$ Here 0 $\rho$ Cosmic length scale -10 -20 $\log(R_{\rm H}/R_{\rm H}^{\rm 0})$ -30 **Cosmic structure originates** -40 "superhorizon" in Standard Big Bag (why would they be quantum?) -50 **SBB** -60 -70--60 -50 -30 -20 -10 0 10 0 $\log(a/a_0)$ Scale factor (measures expansion, time)





#### All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities

- Proof by exhaustion not realistic
- One counterexample (practical utility of non-quantum probabilities) will undermine our entire argument
- Can still invent classical probabilities just to do multiverse cosmology
- Not a problem for many finite theories (AA, Banks &

Compare with identical particle statistics

و ا

Ily do require classical probabilities rousiv (symmetry?...simplicity? See
3.1415926535

#### Bet on the millionth digit of $\pi$

### Bet on the millionth digit of $\pi$

3.1415926535 

The \*only\* thing random is the choice of digit to bet on

#### Bet on the millionth digit of $\pi$

- 3.1415926535
  - The \*only\* thing random is the choice of digit to bet on
  - Fairness is about lack of correlation between digit choice
    and digit value

Etc

# Bet on the millionth digit of $\pi$

- The \*only\* thing random is the choice of digit to bet on
- Fairness is about lack of correlation between digit choice
  and digit value
  - Choice of digit comes from
    - Brain (neurons with quantum uncertainties)
    - ➢ Random number generator → seed → time stamp (when you press ENTER) → brain

# Bet on the millionth digit of $\pi$

- The \*only\* thing random is the choice of digit to bet on
- Fairness is about lack of correlation between digit choice
  and digit value
  - Choice of digit comes from
    - Brain (neurons with quantum uncertainties)
    - ➢ Random number generator → seed → time stamp (when you press ENTER) → brain
      - **Etc**

• The only randomness in a bet on a digit of π is quantum!

42654252786\255181841757407289097772795800081047000010143249192173217214772530 

70217986094

78577134275 54201995611

95105973173 00313783875

35378759375 06548586327

28347913151 25506040092 83744944825

16205696602

### Bet on the millionth digit of $\pi$

- The \*only\* thing random is the choice of digit to bet on
- Fairness is about lack of correlation between digit choice
  and digit value
  - Choice of digit comes from
    - Brain (neurons with quantum uncertainties)
    - ➢ Random number generator → seed → time stamp (when you press ENTER) → brain
      - Etc

The only randomness in a bet on a digit of  $\pi$  is quantum!

<u>Classical Computer</u>: The "computational degrees of freedom" of a classical computer are very classical: Engineered to be well isolated from the quantum fluctuations that are everywhere

- Computations are deterministic
- "Random" is artificial
- Model a classical billiard gas on a computer:
  - All "random" fluctuations are determined by (or "readings of") the initial state.



<u>Classical Computer</u>: The "computational degrees of freedom" of a classical computer are very classical: Engineered to be well isolated from the quantum fluctuations that are everywhere

- Computations are deterministic
- "Random" is artificial
- Model a classical billiard gas on a computer:
  - All "random" fluctuations are determined by (or "readings of") the initial state.



<u>Classical Computer</u>: The "computational degrees of freedom" of a classical computer are very classical: Engineered to be well isolated from the quantum fluctuations that are everywhere

- Computations are deterministic
- "Random" is artificial
- Model a classical billiard gas on a computer:
  - All "random" fluctuations are determined by (or "readings of") the initial state.



Our ideas about probability are like our ideas about color:

- Quantum physics gives the correct foundation to our understanding
- Our "classical" intuition predates our knowledge of QM by a long long time, and works just fine for most things
- Fundamental quantum understanding needed to fix classical misunderstandings in certain cases.





Pocket

Color

Our ideas about probability are like our ideas about color:

- Quantum physics gives the correct foundation to our understanding
- Our "classical" intuition predates our knowledge of QM by a long long time, and works just fine for most things
- Fundamental quantum understanding needed to fix classical misunderstandings in certain cases.





 $\frac{8\pi v^2}{c^3} \frac{hv}{c^{\frac{hv}{kT}}}$ 

Our ideas about probabilit color:

 Quantum physics gives our understanding



' intuition ng long time, and works just fine for

### quantum understanding needed to









Planck Law  $\frac{8\pi v^2}{c^3} \frac{hv}{e^{\frac{hv}{kT}} - 1}$